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REINVENTING EUGENICS: REPRODUCTIVE 
CHOICE AND LAW REFORM AFTER WORLD WAR II
MARY ZIEGLER!
[M]any feel that it is inconsistent to require both that the client consent and 
be feebleminded.  One county specifically asks: “Could some of the ‘red 
tape’ be cut in regard to the consent of the feebleminded adult?  We are 
thinking of a mother of four children, born out of wedlock, who is 
definitely feebleminded and who will not give consent for sterilization....”  
[M]any surveyed felt compulsory powers should be available....  [B]ut if 
compulsory powers were exercised, a great deal of hostility might be 
stirred up which could jeopardize the whole existence of the law.1
When the United States Supreme Court decided Skinner v. United States, 
some observers saw the case as the beginning of the end of the movement for 
eugenic legal reform.2  The term eugenic, coined in 1883 by the British geneticist 
Francis Galton, described a belief that law could be used to improve the quality of 
the population.3  When the Court had last considered a Due Process or Equal 
Protection challenge to compulsory eugenic sterilization law in 1927, only one 
justice dissented from the Court’s decision to uphold the statute.4  Only fifteen 
years after the Buck Court stated that “three generations of imbeciles are enough,”5
the Skinner Court described the right to reproduce as “one of the basic civil rights 
of man.”6
Many scholars have seen this apparently dramatic shift in the Court’s position 
as evidence of the influence of World War II on American reproductive law.7  
During the war, widespread revulsion to the Nazi political program provoked 
! I would like especially to thank Ken Mack, Jon Hanson, and Adrian Vermeule for their comments and 
help during work on this article.
1 MOYA WOODSIDE, STERILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 71 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 
1950).
2 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also James B. O’Hara and T. Howland Sanks, 
Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J. 20 (1956).
3 See generally FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
(Dent & Dutton 1907)(1883).
4 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
5 Id. at 207..
6 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
7 See, e.g., Michael Willrich, The Two Percent Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the 
Socialization of American Law, 1900-1930, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 67-100 (1998).
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serious criticism of American sterilization laws similar to those enforced in 
Germany.8  As a result of this disapproval, the eugenic reform movement is seen to 
have no longer influenced American reproductive law after the War.9
A close examination of pro-eugenic organizations after the War tells a 
significantly different story.  Rather than disappearing from the political scene, 
these organizations appear to have transformed both themselves and the very idea 
of eugenic law.
When originally formed, these organizations reflected ideas that had first 
been discussed in Europe by scholars like Galton.  He proposed that law could 
improve the quality of the population primarily by preventing physically, mentally, 
and morally flawed persons from reproducing.10  When Galton was first writing in 
the nineteenth century, eugenic writings often reflected concern among the upper 
classes about the rising influence of the popular classes on politics, finance, and 
culture.11  At the same time, those eugenic advocates like Galton rejected what 
German theorist Max Nordau termed pessimism, a belief that nothing could be 
done to prevent perceived cultural decline, and proposed instead that the law be 
used to help improve eugenic stock.12
As eugenic theory became influential in the United States in the 1890s, 
leading eugenic proponents increasingly adopted August Weismann’s theory that 
all defects were, in some way, irreversible.13  It was possible that living in a poor 
environment or engaging in a moral indiscretion could deform a person’s genetic 
matter, Weismann theorized, but a better environment could not remedy the 
defect.14  Once created, a defect would be passed on indefinitely from generation to 
generation.15
Given the perceived urgency of the threat Weismann described, many 
lawmakers were primarily interested in devising legal solutions to the problem 
presented by the multiplication of the “unfit.”  In the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century, several states experimented with homes for the mentally 
8 See, e.g., id.; cf. Michael Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 
82 VA. L. REV. 1, 54 (1996) (explaining the effects of anti-Nazi ideology on popular and legal views on 
religious tolerance).
9 See, e.g., Willrich, supra note 7, at 97.
10 See Francis Galton, Types and Their Inheritance, 32 NATURE 507, 507-09 (1885).
11 See, e.g., Donald Pickens, The Sterilization Movement: The Search for Purity in Mind and State, 
28 PHYLON 78, 79 (1967).
12 MAX NORDAU, DEGENERATION 150 (Univ. of Nebraska Press 1895)  Michael Willrich has 
offered an account of the use of eugenic theory to justify an exercise of unprecedented legal power in 
Chicago’s Municipal Court. See Willrich, supra note 6, at 67-100. Other historians of Progressive-era 
legal reforms have emphasized the expansion of legal authority in that period. See generally MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
13 AUGUST WEISMANN, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEXUAL REPRODUCTION IN THE THEORY OF 
NATURAL SELECTION, IN ESSAYS UPON HEREDITY AND KINDRED BIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS (E.B. Poulton, 
S. Schöland, and A.E. Shipley Eds. Clarendon, Uk: Oxford, 1889), 277.
14 Id. at 65.
15 Id.
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retarded.16  However, by the 1890s, many critics had become convinced that 
administrative segregation was ineffective and unnecessarily stigmatizing.17  
Indeed, several states adopted so-called eugenic marriage laws, which allowed only 
those who could pass a battery of blood tests to obtain a marriage license.18
For a variety of reasons, eugenic marriage laws proved to be a spectacular 
failure.  Because the laws required equipment that was often too rare and too 
expensive for most local physicians to acquire, the laws were unpopular as they 
prevented so many people from obtaining marriage licenses.19  More importantly, 
the laws were seen to be ineffective from a eugenic standpoint: morally unfit 
persons were widely believed to have sexual intercourse outside of marriage and so 
would be unaffected by the denial of a marriage license.20  To some observers, the 
need for a more coercive law was apparent.21
Between 1915 and 1940, several states responded by introducing compulsory 
eugenic sterilization laws.22  Focused on people housed in state institutions, the 
laws authorized the sterilization of a loosely defined group that included those 
individuals thought to be insane, handicapped, or sexually promiscuous.23
The rise of such laws in the 1910s can be partly explained by the emergence 
of Progressive politics.24  Many Progressives shared with eugenic theorists a belief 
in the superior knowledge of experts, a suspicion of rights-based arguments made 
by the federal courts, and a conviction that the needs of individuals had to be 
subordinated to those of the community.25
Eugenic compulsory sterilization laws were still frequently applied following 
the decline of Progressive politics.26  After the Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s 
compulsory sterilization law in Buck v. Bell in 1927, a significant number of states 
introduced sterilization laws of their own.27  The decade before the beginning of 
World War II was, for the most part, a successful one for proponents of eugenic 
legal reform.
It was not until the middle of World War II, that eugenic sterilization laws 
16 Pickens, supra note 11, at 84.
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., Eugenic Law Awes Cupid, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1914, at 6.
19 See, e.g., Eugenic Law Flat Failure, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1916, at 14.
20 See Charles Davenport, State Laws Limiting Marriage Selection Examined in Light of Eugenics, 
EUGENICS RECORD OFFICE BULLETIN NO. 9 (1913).
21 See id.
22 See J. H. LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION 49 (The MacMillian Co. 1932).
23 See id.
24 See, e.g., Willrich, supra note 7.
25 See Pickens, supra note 11, at 268-275.
26 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)  The second generation of compulsory eugenic 
sterilization laws appeared most often in the western and southern parts of the United States. See also
EDWARD LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE  DEEP SOUTH 123  (Johns Hopkins Univ. 
Press 1995); see also IAN DOWBIGGIN, KEEPING AMERICA SANE: PSYCHIATRY AND EUGENICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANADA, 1880-1940 104, 125-126 (Cornell Univ. Press 2003).
27 See O’Hara, supra note 2, at 40-41
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came under attack.  Newspapers in the 1940s increasingly mentioned sterilization 
laws only in the context of the Nazi regime.28  Many major American newspapers 
provided extensive, often scathing criticism of Nazi sterilization laws.29  Nazi 
sterilization policies were seen to be totalitarian and American eugenicists often 
had trouble arguing that their own sterilization laws were any different.  Writing to 
the Washington Post, the Reverend F. J. Connell responded to a letter that had 
advocated the sterilization of the unfit:
In his letter of January 10, Dr. H. Curtiss Wood recommends the 
sterilization of persons regarded as unfit for parenthood, particularly the
mentally defective. . . .The argument of Dr. Wood is very similar to that 
[argument] presented to the Reichstag in support of the sterilization policy 
which was put into operation in Nazi Germany on Jan. 1, 1934....  It would 
be interesting to know if Dr. Wood favors the entire Nazi policy or just this 
feature.30
Many American eugenicists had trouble responding to critiques like the one 
framed by Reverend Connell, and popular support for eugenics declined 
accordingly.
Yet the association with Nazism did not spell the end of eugenic influence on 
reproductive law.  Traditional histories of eugenics often conclude that World War 
II effectively marked the end of eugenic regulation of reproduction and sexual 
behavior.31  This article will argue instead that, in some cases, proponents of 
eugenic sterilization laws modernized eugenic legislation to reflect the changing 
norms of the post-war era.
Public awareness of Nazi racial policies changed but did not end laws 
allowing the government to control parenthood.  Nazi sterilization policy had been 
condemned by many for being totalitarian, overbroad, racially motivated, and 
entirely compulsory.32  Yet, despite a potentially damning connection to Nazi 
practices, some social workers and legislators invoked a recent crisis in the number 
of out-of-wedlock births to justify an expansion of laws designed to deter those 
seen to be morally unfit from having children.33
28 Sterilization of Criminals and Insane Favored, 8-2, THE ATLANTA CONST., May 23, 1937.
29 See, e.g., Harold Callenders, Goebbels’ Tactics Hint at Nazi Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 27, 1942, at 
13; see also Nazified Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1942, at E1; see also Dana Adams Schmidt, Nazi 
Medical Horrors Revealed At New Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1947, at 102; B. D. Arlington, 
Sterilization of Germans, WASH. POST, Sep. 10, 1944, at B4.
30 Rev. F. J. Connell, Sterilization, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1947, at 6.
31 See Willrich, supra note 7, at 98; but cf LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A
HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 196-212 (Univ. of Illinois Press 2002) (arguing that 
the influence of eugenics in law declined but that eugenic thought influenced the evolution of Planned 
Parenthood and the birth control movement).
32 See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 71.
33 See RICKIE SOLLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE; SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V.
WADE 13 (Routledge 1992); WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 211 (Univ. of California 
Press 1965).
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A spike in out-of-wedlock births made the compulsory sterilization of “unfit” 
unwed mothers appear a more attractive legislative option.  Between 1950 and 
1967, more than 12 states considered a measure to compulsorily sterilize unwed 
mothers, and yet all of these bills failed to pass.34  Similarly, there is evidence that 
some important members of the Senate seriously considered introducing 
compulsory sterilization legislation but decided against such a strategy because of 
the perceived unpopularity of compulsory sterilization laws.35  Even North 
Carolina, a state still widely applying its compulsory eugenic sterilization law from 
1950 to 1965, was unable to expand its law.36
If there was widespread support for such a eugenic law, then why did the 
attempts to pass a compulsory law universally fail?  Moya Woodside, a British 
sociologist and commentator on North Carolina’s law, argued that an effective 
eugenic law could not be compulsory but would instead have to respect free 
choice.37  “Laws providing for voluntary sterilization in democratic countries bear 
no resemblance to the German experience,” Woodside wrote.  “[The] preservation 
of individual liberty does more in the long run to encourage sterilization as a 
measure of social betterment.”38
The laws that developed from 1950-1967 confirmed that Woodside’s 
intuition was insightful.  As noted, a traditional history of eugenics often concludes 
that World War II spelled the end of eugenic influence on the law.  This article will 
argue instead that World War II required eugenic laws, at least in appearance, to 
respect some form of reproductive choice.
The new emphasis on choice forced pro-eugenic organizations to transform 
their strategies and rhetoric.  Because eugenic legal theory had been criticized for 
being political rather than scientific, some pro-eugenic organizations began, in the 
1950s, to renounce lobbying in order to focus on funding research that 
demonstrated the benefits of improving the “quality” of the population.  The 
leaders of other organizations identified less controversial programs of legal reform 
that they believed would have the same effects as would an openly eugenic 
program.  Between 1950 and 1966, pro-eugenic organizations increasingly saw 
population control reform as an ideal program of this sort.  The platform that 
resulted from these changes appeared to better account for individual choice but 
was also more openly racist than earlier eugenic legal reform projects had been.
Perhaps most importantly, the new reform efforts offered their own 
definitions of reproductive choice.  Many people thought to be socially inadequate 
were seen as unable to make the right reproductive decisions themselves, and pro-
eugenic organizations advised their volunteers to omit or favorably characterize the 
34 See, e.g., House Backs Senate Over Banking Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1962, at B2.
35 Bill Urging Sterilization Hit, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1960, at A9.
36 WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 24.
37 Id.
38 Id.
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facts about birth control or sterilization and to take advantage of emotional or 
physical weakness in order to assure that the “right choice” was made.
Thus, it is not the case that eugenics was no longer a significant influence on 
American reproductive law after World War II.  Rather, pro-eugenic organizations 
adapted to the new political climate that emerged after 1945.  Instead of defending 
the merits of state coercion in reproductive matters, pro-eugenic organizations 
themselves now sought to define reproductive choice.
By studying the introduction and failure of expanded compulsory sterilization 
laws in the 1950s and 1960s, Part I examines the political rejection of 
governmental coercion in reproductive matters.  Part II studies the alternative 
strategies adopted by two of the most influential post-war pro-eugenic 
organizations, Human Betterment and the Population Council.  By evaluating the 
workings of a post-war compulsory sterilization statute, Part III demonstrates the 
effects of the new political emphasis on reproductive choice on existing laws.  Part 
IV is a brief conclusion.
I. COMPULSORY STERILIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
A traditional account of eugenics in law often concludes that anti-Nazi 
ideology doomed eugenic sterilization laws that were themselves similar to laws 
used by the Nazis.  The anti-Nazi ideology theory is in many ways a sensible one.  
Eugenics was a much less high profile issue in the 1950s and 1960s. Between 1950 
and 1960, the term eugenic or any version of it appeared 774 times in the New York 
Times, the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post, or the Los Angeles Times, 
compared to 1,744 times between 1930 and 1940.39  The New York Times and the 
Chicago Tribune covered Nazi sterilization policies extensively and often 
negatively.40  From the perspective of a current observer, it might seem inevitable 
that American sterilization policies would be condemned if Nazi sterilization 
policies were.
The Supreme Court opinion in Skinner v. Oklahoma plausibly supports an 
anti-Nazi ideology argument.  In Skinner, the Court struck down an Oklahoma 
statute that provided for the sterilization of specified groups of repeat offenders.41  
Although Skinner  has come to stand for the existence of a substantive Due Process 
right to procreation,42 the decision was made on Equal Protection grounds.  Justice 
Douglas, writing for the Court, concluded that the distinctions drawn by the statute 
39 Proquest Historical Newspapers search by the author (June 28, 2006) (receiving over 1,700 hits 
in search for term eugenic in above-mentioned newspapers).
40 See text accompanying supra notes 26-29 (discussing problems associated with Nazi sterilization 
programs).
41 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
42 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973).
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between offenders who committed similar and equally serious crimes could not 
survive rational basis review.43
In spite of the limited scope of the holding, there is evidence to support a 
contention that Skinner was an anti-Nazi decision.  Press coverage of Nazi 
sterilization policy peaked in 1941,44 a year before Skinner came out.  The Court 
used rhetoric that could support an anti-Nazi reading, condemning Oklahoma’s law 
as interfering too much with “a sensitive and important area of human rights...” and 
depriving “individuals of a right which is basic to the... race—the right to have 
offspring.”45
But those who supported eugenic sterilization laws had powerful motivations, 
often believing intensely in the rightness of eugenics whether or not the Nazis were 
associated with it. These motivations might have made it easier to see distinctions 
between Nazi sterilization policies and American sterilization laws.
Skinner does not preclude the drawing of such a distinction.  Significantly, 
Skinner struck down a law providing for the forcible sterilization of felons who had 
offended more than three times.46  The statute in question was punitive in nature.  
In fact, openly punitive sterilization laws had been struck down by state courts in 
the 1910s and condemned by eugenicists in the 1930s.47  Skinner can be read as a 
continuation of this trend as opposed to a change in course.  It is notable that the 
Skinner Court did not strike down Buck v. Bell.48  Indeed, in 1942, the Court might 
not have been willing to strike down sterilization laws of the sort upheld in Buck.
Moreover, Skinner had a narrow holding.  Oklahoma’s sterilization law was 
struck down on Equal Protection grounds, mostly because the law targeted some 
felons while leaving alone felons who had committed crimes that were just as 
serious.49  In fact, the Court explicitly upheld and distinguished Buck v. Bell, which 
it saw as involving a sufficiently rational law.  Only Justice Jackson, writing in 
concurrence, raised the possibility that there might be something wrong with any 
compulsory sterilization law.50  It is likely that the Skinner Court had considered 
the evils of Nazi sterilization laws, but the Court was not ready to condemn more 
popular eugenic policies.  For the Court, some eugenic policies were acceptable and 
some were not.  Some laws had been tainted by Nazism and some had not.
43 Id.
44 Proquest Historical Newspapers search by the author (September 14, 2006) (search hits for Nazi 
sterilization in period between 1940 and 1943)..
45 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
46 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
47 See Mickel v. Heinrichs, 262 Fed. 688 (D.C. Nevada 1918); see also Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 
413 (Iowa 1914); see also WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 160 (“It is unfortunate that some states in the 
U.S. still sanction sterilization or castration for certain classes of criminals and sexual offenders. This 
creates the impression that sterilization is a punitive measure [which creates] distrust.”).
48 See especially Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540-541, 544-555.
49 Id. at 542.
50 Id. at 545 (Stone, J., Concurring).
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The laws passed between 1950 and 1967 to address the illegitimacy problem 
help explain what was considered objectionable about Nazi reproductive policy.  
For various reasons, eugenic laws had long targeted unwed mothers on public 
assistance.  Some legislators and theorists emphasized the “unnecessary” costs of 
paying relief to unwed mothers and their children.51  Other eugenic theorists 
stressed that women who repeatedly had sexual intercourse outside of wedlock 
were necessarily defective and would have defective children.52  Following the 
theory of August Weismann, these theorists argued that immoral sexual behavior 
could deform a woman’s germ plasm and, in turn, produce defects in her 
children.53
By the 1950s, many no longer believed that unwed mothers were always 
hereditarily defective, but it was still often thought that the children of unwed 
mothers themselves had social problems, either because of bad heredity, exposure 
to a bad environment, or both.54  In the 1950s, a variety of newspapers suggested 
that America was experiencing an illegitimacy crisis.55  A greater proportion of 
unwed mothers were reported to be white,56 and a greater proportion of those on 
welfare were believed to be unwed mothers.57  Elyce Ferster wrote in 1966 that the 
new explanations and “arguments advanced in favor [of such compulsory 
sterilization] are the same as those used by proponents of eugenic sterilization.  
Society has the right to prevent itself from being swamped by mental illness, 
mental retardation, crime, poverty, etc.”58  In Ferster’s view, only the rhetoric of 
lawmakers had changed.  Ferster stated that “eugenicists argued that the prevention 
of procreation was necessary because children of parents having these defects 
would have the same defects by reason of heredity.  Now the claim is that children 
will have the same defects because the parents are too socially inadequate.”59
As Ferster predicted, between 1950 and 1967, many state legislatures were 
attracted to these arguments, but they ultimately rejected a compulsory sterilization 
51 Baltimore Welfare Denounced, WASH. POST,  Dec. 11, 1947 at 1 (explaining argument that 
welfare encouraged illegitimacy); see also William Sheridan, Jr., Illegitimacy and ADC, CHI. TRIB., 
May 9, 1955 at 20 (state legislator condemning costs imposed by unwed mothers on welfare)..
52 See, e.g., PAUL POPENOE, THE FEEBLEMINDED, IN COLLECTED PAPERS ON EUGENIC  
STERILIZATION IN CALIFORNIA  (PASADENA: THE HUMAN BETTERMENT FOUNDATION, 1928), 321.
53 Scott Christianson, Bad Seed or Bad Science, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2003, at B9 (describing 
Dugdale’s use of female “licentiousness” and “harlotry” as markers of eugenic defect); see also PHILLIP 
R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 14 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1991).
54 See Elyce Zenoff Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit -- Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 
591, 610 (1966).
55 See, e.g., Sterilization Urged to Cut Costs of ADC, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 1961, at 26; See MIMI 
ABRAMOWITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES 
TO THE PRESENT 320-321 (South End Press 1996).
56 See ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 55, at 321.
57 See id.
58 Ferster, supra note 54, at 610.
59 Id.
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law for unwed mothers.  It is important to consider what led to the rejection of 
sterilization programs some legislators so obviously found appealing.
Part of the attraction was related to the limits placed on existing sterilization 
laws.  Although many states still had compulsory sterilization statutes on the books 
in 1957, most of these laws were rarely applied.60  Almost all of them were 
ultimately repealed between 1968 and 1975.61  The states that applied their 
compulsory sterilization laws more vigorously could often do so only after clearing 
several procedural hurdles.62  In 1950, then, it was difficult for almost all of the 
thirty states with compulsory sterilization laws on the books to sterilize “morally 
unfit” women.  States that still wanted to reduce the number of unfit children had to 
find other legal means to discourage women perceived to be socially inadequate 
from having more children.
Nonetheless, these states continued to consider expanding or adopting new 
compulsory sterilization legislation.  Many passed alternatives to compulsory 
sterilization shortly after the defeat of such legislation or public outcry at its 
introduction.  The experience of these states helps to illustrate both that eugenics 
still influenced American reproductive law and that laws reflecting this influence 
had to respect reproductive choice.
A. Virginia, North Carolina, and “Voluntary” Sterilization
Both Virginia and North Carolina faced proposals to compulsorily sterilize 
unwed mothers irrespective of whether they qualified as feebleminded or insane 
under the state’s eugenic sterilization law.
In 1956, Representative E. Ralph James of Hampton, Virginia, introduced a 
proposal that would have allowed the superintendent of public welfare in any 
county to petition a local judge to order mothers of more than one illegitimate child 
to be sterilized unless they could show that they should not be sterilized.63  This 
bill was defeated, but three further sterilization proposals were introduced in 1960, 
including two compulsory sterilization proposals.64  These proposals were again 
defeated.  In 1962, another compulsory sterilization bill was introduced, but this 
time, the state passed a voluntary sterilization bill.65
North Carolina followed a similar path.  Representative W. M. Jolly 
introduced bills in 1956, 1958, and 1963 that would have expanded compulsory 
60 See O’Hara and Sanks, supra note 2 (Three states, North Carolina, Virginia, and California, 
continued applying their sterilization laws to more than 300 people per year between 1940 and 1957.).
61 See generally NANCY ORDOVER, AMERICAN EUGENICS: RACE, QUEER ANATOMY, AND THE 
SCIENCE OF NATIONALISM (Univ. of Minnesota Press 2003).
62 See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 30-32 (Woodside explains the frustrations of officials 
administering a compulsory statute in the face of various procedural requirements.).
63 Julius Paul, The Return of Punitive Sterilization Proposals: Current Attacks on Illegitimacy and 
the AFDC, 3 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 92, 97 (1968).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 98.
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sterilization legislation to cover “grossly sexually delinquent persons.”66  The Jolly 
bill provided that mothers of unwed children be brought before the State Eugenics 
board and be required to demonstrate why they should not be sterilized.67  After the 
birth of a third illegitimate child, there would be a rebuttable presumption in favor 
of sterilization.68  North Carolina rejected these proposals not because state 
legislators believed that unwed mothers could produce fit children, but rather 
because they believed that compulsory sterilization was an ineffective means of 
stemming the tide of unfit parents.69  Dr. John C. Burwell, a member of the neo-
eugenic Human Betterment League of North Carolina, wrote:
Recent legislative attempts in North Carolina to ameliorate the problem of 
illegitimacy by some form of compulsory legislation may be... 
detrimental... to those of us interested in voluntary sterilization. 
Detrimental in that these attempts leave an implication in the public mind 
that any consideration of sterilization is on a compulsory basis.70
B. Penalties and Wrong Choices
At one point, other states considered compulsory sterilization in addition to 
legislation that would impose a short prison term and a fine on unwed mothers.  In 
Illinois, for example, state Senator George M. Brydia proposed a compulsory 
sterilization provision for unwed mothers.71  Several alternative bills were met with 
greater approval, including Senate Bill No. 1066, which provided for a one-year 
prison sentence and a fine for women who had a second illegitimate child and a 
three to five-year sentence for mothers of three or more illegitimate children, and 
House Bill No. 1561, which allowed the Family Court to remove existing children 
from the custody of an unwed mother.72
Similar proposals passed in other states after related compulsory sterilization 
measures failed.  In Louisiana, a 1958 commission charged with addressing the 
state’s illegitimacy problem considered, but ultimately rejected, a compulsory 
sterilization measure on the grounds that such laws were “intrinsically evil, 
completely immoral and violative of all concepts of Christianity.”73  The 
commission recommended, and the state eventually adopted, Act 75, which instead 
provided for a one-year prison sentence and a fine designed to deter unfit parents 
from having children.74
66 Id. at 92; see also Ellen Key Blunt, Sterilization Bill, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1965, at C1.
67 Paul, supra note 63, at 92-93.
68 Id. at 93.
69 Id. at 93-94
70 Id. at 94.
71 Sterilization Urged to Cut Costs of ADC, supra note 55, at 26.
72 Paul, supra note 63, at 81-82.
73 Id. at 83 (quoting Report of the Committee (Rep. Walter Chachere, Chairman)).
74 Id. at 84.
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Similarly, Maryland first considered compulsory sterilization as a way to 
limit unfit parenthood and only later resorted to criminal penalty legislation.75  
Senator John L. Sanford, Jr. introduced a bill in 1960 which provided for a one 
thousand dollar fine or three-year prison sentence, a permanent loss of child 
custody, and a bar on receipt of welfare funds, as well as compulsory sterilization 
of unwed mothers who continued to have illegitimate children.76  The bill easily 
passed in the Senate but was defeated in the House of Delegates.77  Delegate 
Russell Hickman introduced a bill in 1963 which provided for voluntary 
sterilization and compulsory eugenic sterilization of the mentally deficient.78  
Ultimately, neither of these bills passed.79  Delaware introduced legislation in the 
1950s and again in the 1960s, under which an unwed mother would have to be 
sterilized in order to be eligible for welfare payments.80  Similarly, in Iowa, in 
December of 1963, state Senator Howard Buck proposed to a legislative committee 
that the state sterilize all unwed mothers who received welfare payments.81
The lesson taken from the failure of these laws is that a criminal penalty 
divorced from a sterilization provision, would be more likely to pass.  It had 
become clear that a compulsory sterilization law was no longer politically feasible.  
In Mississippi, lawmakers learned a similar lesson.  Representative David Glass 
introduced a bill in 1958 which would require mothers of two or more illegitimate 
children to be sterilized if a Chancery Court determined that the “immorality of 
said female [was] detrimental to the state or the community.”82  Although this bill 
died on the House Calendar, a related bill was introduced in 1964 by W. B. Meek, 
which allowed unwed mothers to submit to compulsory sterilization or a prison 
term.83
Apparently, this bill still did not appear to confer real choice on sterilization 
candidates: the bill generated considerable backlash from local civil rights 
organizations and voluntary sterilization advocates.  Letters to the editor published 
in Newsweek magazine similarly condemned the coercive aspects of the law.84  A 
student advocacy group began an influential campaign against the bill85 that played 
up connections between compulsory sterilization in Mississippi and the Nazi 
75 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF ILLEGITIMACY, STATE OF MARYLAND
26 (1961).
76 Paul, supra note 63, at 84-86.
77 Id. at 85.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 85-86.
80 See Paul, supra note 63, at 80.
81 Id. at 82.
82 Id. at 88.
83 Id. at 89.
84 Id. at 90; see also Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America et al. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 20, n.5, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496).
85 See Paul, supra note 63, at 90.
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regime.86  Were Mississippi to seek to achieve the same eugenic purpose without 
resorting to compulsory sterilization, it seemed likely that such legislation would 
not create the same resistance.  This appears to have been an accurate prediction: 
Mississippi was able to pass a bill that provided for a fine and prison sentence for 
mothers of two or more illegitimate children.87
It is worth noting that, in the same period, several states hardened their 
criminal penalties regarding illegitimacy, and perhaps for the same reasons.  
Between 1950 and 1961, Maryland, Georgia, Mississippi, Delaware, Alabama, and 
Massachusetts passed new laws punishing illegitimacy, expanded existing criminal 
laws, or made the penalties under existing law harsher.88  Illinois also considered 
passing a law criminalizing unwed motherhood for AFDC recipients.89  As noted, 
Maryland and Mississippi imposed fines and prison terms on any woman who had 
more than two illegitimate children.90  In 1956, Georgia made abandonment of 
children a misdemeanor only if the children were illegitimate.91
Unlike a sterilization law, a criminal illegitimacy law was more often seen to 
respect choice.  Nazi sterilization laws had been condemned for being compulsory.  
In contrast, criminal illegitimacy laws gave notice of condemned conduct and then 
punished wrong choices after they were made.  Maryland’s law punished only 
women who had continued to make “bad choices” by having more than a certain 
number of illegitimate children.92  Criminal neglect or abandonment laws also 
framed penalties in terms of reproductive choice: either a person could make the 
right choice, or she would choose to be punished.  Lawmakers could create 
incentives to make the right choices without compelling anyone not to have a child.  
Thus, an illegimacy law could accomplish indirectly what compulsory sterilization 
laws had accomplished.
Moreover, the political ramifications of a compulsory sterilization law were 
now clear.  When several states introduced compulsory sterilization laws, many 
observers condemned the use of governmental coercion in private reproductive 
matters.93  Nonetheless, it is a mistake to think that the organizations and programs 
in place after World War II no longer reflected a eugenic influence.  Julius Paul, an 
authority on the campaign for compulsory sterilization between 1950 and 1967, 
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See Bill Subjecting Unwed Mothers to 2 Yrs Prison Ok’d, CHI. DEF., May 2, 1959, at 2; BELL, 
supra note 33, at 210-215; Ga. L. 1956 §74-9901 (1956); Bill to Curb Illegitimacy is Signed in Miss., 
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1964, at 28; Mass. G.L. c. 273 §15 (1963); Ward v. State, 170 So. 2d 500, 502 
(Ala. Ct. App. 1964) (evaluating a statutory increase in the abandonment penalty regarding illegitimate 
children to $100 per incident).
89 Sterilization Urged, supra note 55, at 26.
90 See text accompanying supra note 79, 87 (discussing use of criminal penalties for mothers of 
illegitimate children).
91 See Williams v. State, 98 S.E. 2d 373 (Ga. 1957).
92 See Bill Subjecting, supra note 88, at 2.
93 See, e.g., text accompanying supra notes 77, 83 (discussing failure of sterilization bills for 
unwed mothers).
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explained in 1968 that the effort to pass such laws or equivalents to them 
represented only a slight change in the focus of eugenic legal reformers: “[w]hereas 
earlier eugenic efforts were aimed at cutting off the ‘defective germ plasm’ before 
it ‘drowns us,’ current efforts would be aimed at cutting off the defective germ 
plasm and welfare payments.”94
In the wake of the perceived illegitimacy crisis, legislators interested in 
improving the “quality” of the population were forced to find alternatives to the use 
of overt coercion.  The definition of choice that emerged in alternative proposals 
was a narrow one, but it was the goal of pro-eugenic organizations active in the 
1950s and 1960s to change this definition.  Part II of this note considers the work of 
two of the most influential pro-eugenic organizations in order to clarify the changes 
in the debates that shaped American reproductive law.
II. THE REINVENTION OF EUGENIC ADVOCACY
A. The Population Council and Contraceptive Incompetence
Founded in 1952, the Population Council was formed partly by leaders of the 
eugenic legal reform movement who intended to create a new kind of organization 
in response to post-war politics: an organization that would prevent overall 
population growth and preserve the “quality” of the population.95  At the 
organization’s founding conference in Williamsburg, Virginia, members 
emphasized a broad range of potential goals, including research on world food 
supply, alternative energy sources, and alternative methods of contraception.96  
Nonetheless, a significant number of founding members, including Frederick 
Osborn, Kingsley Davis, and Frank Notestein, maintained their ties with the 
eugenic legal reform movement.97
Not surprisingly, these members continued to endorse eugenic goals, but they 
now characterized those goals as matters of population control.  The Council’s 
evolution offers a powerful example of how pro-eugenic groups redefined 
themselves and their programs in order to ensure their political survival.  Members 
of the organization worked to achieve this goal in three ways.  First, the leaders of 
the Council deemphasized openly eugenic projects.  Relying on a theory that the 
poorest and least eugenically fit individuals were often the most fertile, leaders of 
the Council believed that the quality of the population would be improved if overall 
population growth was checked.  Second, instead of disavowing the idea that the 
law could be used to improve the quality of the population, leaders of the 
organization argued in favor of a kind of voluntary eugenics.  They asserted that the 
94 See Paul, supra note 63, at 101.
95 John D. Rockefeller III, On the Origins of the Population Council, 3 POPULATION & DEV. REV.
493, 493 (1977).
96 Id. at 495-496.
97 See id.
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quality of the population could be improved if otherwise “incompetent” people 
were assisted in making the right choices.  Finally, the organization’s leaders 
concluded that the Council could campaign for eugenic legal reform only after 
convincing the public that the organization focused on objective scientific research 
rather than on lobbying.
These ideas first emerged at a meeting sponsored by the National Academy 
of Science in the summer of 1952.98  The demographers, biologists, and geneticists 
present agreed that a potential decline in the quality of the population was 
integrally related to the overall population growth.99  The organization’s founder, 
John D. Rockefeller III, explained: “[t]here was a brief discussion of the problem of 
‘quality.’  It was felt that this was part of the background of the questions to which 
the committee devoted its time.  Modern civilization has reduced natural selection, 
saving more ‘weak’ lives and allowing them to reproduce.”100  Among other goals, 
Council members agreed to pursue research in both the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of population in the United States.101
Recognizing the connection between eugenic goals and issues of population 
control was politically significant for the Council.  Although founded largely by 
eugenicists, the organization was openly identified only with population control.  
The reasons for this were straightforward.  Without paying the same significant 
political costs, the Council could accomplish eugenic goals by promoting legal 
reforms designed to limit population.
Between 1952 and 1960, members of the Council realized that they would 
also need to change the structure and image of their pro-eugenic organization.  
Those in the organization who considered themselves to be scientists or social 
scientists, like Davis and Osborn, were particularly sensitive to frequent comments 
that eugenicists had no expertise and that eugenics was not a valid science.102  
During and after World War II, critics of eugenic legal reforms increasingly argued 
that, like the Nazis in Germany, American eugenicists were politically motivated 
and interested only in pseudosciences that would support their own biases.103  
Following the publication of a study overseen by the American Neurological 
Association in 1936, a growing number of critics asserted that there was no 
scientific evidence that compulsory sterilization laws had a eugenic effect.104  
Taking up an argument from the published report, critics also questioned the 
98 See generally Id.
99 Id. at 496, 501.
100 See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 496.
101 Id. at 501.
102 See, e.g., Frank Notestein, Frederick Osborn: Demography’s Statesman on His Eightieth Spring, 
35 POPULATION INDEX 367, 367-371 (1969) (Notestein and Osborn both frequently referred to 
themselves and to one another as scientists or demographers).
103 See, e.g., A Policy on Population?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1951, at B4.
104 ABRAHAM MYERSON ET AL., EUGENICAL STERILIZATION: A REORIENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 
(Macmillan 1936).
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validity of the very categories used in various sterilization statutes.105  For some, 
the necessary conclusion appeared to be that American eugenics, like Nazi 
eugenics, was the product of ideology and political compromise rather than 
scientific research.106
In response, the leaders of the Council decided that, for a period of several 
years, the organization would refrain from political lobbying and concentrate 
instead on funding research.107  By selectively sponsoring and shaping research 
projects, the Council’s leaders hoped to collect seemingly objective data that could 
later be shown to local administrators and lawmakers.  In the early 1950s, leaders 
of the organization also decided to emphasize programs that appeared to have 
different focuses.108  Arguably, some of these programs were genuinely unrelated 
to the Council’s population quality program, especially those involving 
environmental preservation, world hunger, and alternative food and fuel sources.109  
In other cases, projects were population quality measures in everything but name, 
especially proposed “maternal health” initiatives that often focused on discouraging 
poor women from having more children.110  In either case, it was important to 
members of the Council that the organization appear to be politically neutral and 
involved in diverse scientific studies.
By the mid-1950s, several members of the Council also became convinced 
that the idea of eugenic reform needed to be reshaped.111  Frederick Osborn, a 
prominent member of the Council, was especially interested in the damaged 
reputation of eugenic legal reform, because he served as the president of the 
American Eugenic Society in the same period.112  In eugenic circles, Osborn had 
long considered himself a moderating influence, because he rejected the racist and 
racialist accounts of eugenic defects set forth by many eugenicists between 1910 
and 1940.113  In the mid-1950s, the response that followed proposals to expand 
compulsory sterilization laws was instructive.  Few critics of the law defended 
unwed mothers on welfare or rejected the idea that a deterrent was needed to 
105 March of Science, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1955, at E5.
106 Rap Outmoded Laws Aimed at Epileptics; Neurologists Demand Revisions, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 
1954, at 12.
107 For examples of the kind of research project the Council later funded, see, e.g., Victor Wilson, 
Science Group Urges World Birth Control, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1963, at 14; see also Jacques Nevard, 
India Trying Loop to Reduce Births, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1965, at 12; see also Peter Prugh, Patching 
Up Families: Varied New Programs Aim to Curb Breakdown in Negro Home Life, WALL ST. J., 
November 30, 1965, at 1.
108 See Rockefeller, supra note 95 at 494-496 (describing early agenda of Population Council from 
founding conference).
109 Many of these concerns were articulated by the organization’s founding members as early as 
1952. See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 493.
110 For an example of a similar, but later program, see Jane Brody, Population Group Offers Care 
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 1971, at 36.
111 See GORDON, supra note 31, at 281-282 (evaluating involvement of eugenicists in nascent 
population control movement) .
112 See id.
113 See Notestein, supra note 102, at 369(explaining Osborn’s role as a moderate in eugenic circles).
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prevent out-of-wedlock births.114  Most often, critics objected only to the fact that 
the sterilizations would be compulsory.115
In 1954, Osborn drew on this interest in voluntary sterilization in giving a 
new definition of eugenics. Osborn explained,
[t]he largest families should not be found as a characteristic of particular 
racial or social or economic groups but among all couples who give 
evidence of socially valuable qualities....  There can be no arbitrary 
decisions on who should or should not have children. The parents 
themselves must make that choice.116
Improving the quality of the population had been described as a separate but 
related goal.  Later in the decade, several influential politicians expressed interest in 
measures to achieve international and domestic population control.117  At the same 
time, Council leaders became convinced that it would be difficult to rehabilitate 
openly eugenic programs or research studies.118  Efforts to study and propose ways 
to improve the quality of the population would have to be more closely connected 
than ever to the idea of population control.
The ground for doing so had been laid in the 1930s by demographers like 
Notestein and Osborn, who belonged to the eugenic legal reform coalition.  Both 
Notestein and Osborn had played an important role in the study of so-called 
differential fertility.119  It had long been assumed that state governments 
developing compulsory sterilization laws wanted to know what measures had to be 
taken to ensure that more fit people than unfit people were having children.  As a 
general matter, eugenicists believed that the unfit were more fertile than the fit.120  
As early as 1933, Osborn had posited that low intelligence was closely correlated 
with social class.121  He argued that the unfit tended to be poor, and the poor 
tended to have more children.122
In the late 1950s, Osborn, Notestein, and other members of the Council 
revived the idea of differential fertility in order to repackage the Council’s pro-
114 See Paul, supra note 63 at 90.
115 See id.
116 Frederick Osborn, Population Problems and the American Eugenics Society, SCI., May 1954, at 
3A.
117 Ernest Gruening, a Senator from Alaska, was the most vocal supporter of population control 
efforts in the early 1960s. See Letter by Eisenhower on Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1965, at 25. 
By the middle of the decade, however, population control politics had become less controversial and 
more prominent. See THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 
7-16 (Donald T. Critchlow ed., 2002).
118 Rockefeller and the other founding members carefully avoided the use of the term eugenic, or 
any rhetoric associated with it.  See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 496.
119 See, e.g., FRANK LORIMER AND FREDERICK OSBORN, DYNAMICS OF POPULATION:  SOCIAL AND 
BIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGING BIRTH RATES IN THE UNITED STATES (Macmillan 1934).
120 See, e.g., Frederick Osborn, Characteristics and Differential Fertility of American Population 
Groups, 12 SOC. FORCES 1,4 (1933).
121 See id.
122 See id.
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eugenic reforms.123  If it was widely agreed that population control was desirable, 
Osborn argued, one had to check the growth of especially fertile people, and 
exceptionally fertile people tended to be “the socially inadequate—those families 
who are perennially on relief rolls, the constant problem of the social worker.”124  
Thus, if an overall reduction in world and domestic population growth inevitably 
improved the quality of population, those interested in eugenics could achieve the 
same goals by studying and campaigning for less controversial population control 
reforms.125
However, the Population Council’s new focus on population control issues 
had a surprising consequence.  As Council research emphasized ways to reduce 
rates of reproduction among “high fertility groups,” the Council’s research interests 
and policy proposals displayed a more overt racial bias.  In the early 1960s, the 
Council began sponsoring research on ways to reduce growth rates in urban and 
rural African-American areas.126  This new research focus reflected two ideas that 
were then becoming common among members of the Council.  First, the new 
research suggested that it would be desirable to reduce the size of the African-
American population.  Second, the research focus demonstrated that a growing 
number of Council members believed that the “socially inadequate” were rarely 
white.
It may seem counterintuitive that some aspects of reproductive law and 
politics were more openly racist in the 1950s and 1960s than they had been before 
World War II.  This is especially the case because a good deal of current 
scholarship on the eugenic legal reform movement of the earlier twentieth century 
justifiably emphasizes the anti-immigrant or racist character of the movement.127  
There is truth in this argument.  Eugenic legal reformers sponsored successful race-
based immigration quotas, anti-miscegenation laws, and sterilization programs for 
those in segregated hospitals.128
However, for a variety of reasons, compulsory eugenic sterilization laws 
were not, for the most part, disproportionately applied to members of racial 
minorities before World War II.  First, in southern states where racial prejudice was 
the strongest, non-white hospitals did not have the equipment or staff to perform a 
123 See, e.g., Osborn, supra note 115, at 3A.
124 Frederick Osborn, Qualitative Aspects of Population Control: Eugenics and Euthenics, 25 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 406, 423 (1960).
125 See id.
126 See Research Proposal, “Problems of Bearing and Rearing Children in High-Fertility, Low-
Income, Low Education American Families,” (1960) in The Rockefeller Archive, Rockefeller 
University, POPULATION COUNCIL PAPERS, Box 46, Folder 653.
127 See, e.g., STEFAN KUHL, THE NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND GERMAN 
NATIONAL SOCIALISM (Oxford Univ. Press 2002); see also EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK:
EUGENICS AND AMERICA’S CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE (Thunder’s Mouth Press 2003).
128 See Albert Ernest Jenks, The Legal Status of Negro-White Amalgamation in the United States, 21 
AM. J. OF  SOC. 666 (1916); W. A. Plecker, Shall We All Be Mullatoes?, LITERARY DIG.,  March 27, 
1925.
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large number of sterilizations.  For example, a study of North Carolina’s 
compulsory eugenic sterilization law reported that such hospitals were poorly 
equipped and performed only a token number of sterilizations.129  Moreover, the 
operations that were performed were mostly considered punitive rather than 
eugenic measures.130
Second, in the North, sterilizations were still performed primarily on those in 
state institutions, regardless of race.131  It is true that some of the “conditions” that 
could justify a eugenic sterilization, including alcoholism and unwed motherhood, 
were likely to be associated with poverty.132  To the extent that race was correlated 
with poverty, members of racial minorities might have been exposed to compulsory 
sterilization more often than were Caucasians.
Nonetheless, there is evidence that members of racial minorities were not 
disproportionately subjected to sterilization in the North.  This was the case for 
several reasons.  First, many prominent eugenicists were concerned that 
sterilization laws would be considered unscientific if the laws were openly 
racist.133  Additionally, African-Americans and Hispanics were sometimes less 
likely to be placed in mental institutions.134
In the later 1950s, as evolving eugenic ideology focused on those who 
actually had more children, groups like the Council increasingly targeted members 
of racial minorities.  The new eugenic agenda required the appearance of more 
rigorous scientific study and respect for reproductive choice, but that agenda also 
produced a more overtly racist set of studies and proposals.
This shift becomes apparent from a study of the work of Donald Bogue that 
was sponsored and shaped by the leaders of the Council.  A member of the 
University of Chicago’s Population Research and Training Center, Bogue began to 
receive most of his funding from the Council after 1960.135  The definition of “high 
fertility” groups given by Bogue in a request for grant funding was largely based on 
race: Bogue listed African-Americans, Puerto-Ricans, Native Americans and white 
immigrants as groups with high fertility rates.136  Bogue argued that members of 
these groups continued to make wrong choices with respect to family planning 
because they were incompetent, unmotivated, or influenced by their own or their 
family’s culture.137  What was needed was a program that used all measures short 
129 WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 29, 33.
130 Id. at 32.
131 See Kills Wisconsin Bill to Sterilize Insane, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 1925, at 3 (Wisconsin governor 
vetoing bill because sterilization applied only to those in institutions).
132 See, e.g., POPENOE, supra note 52, at 268.
133 See, e.g., The Scientist Speaks to Us, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1912, at BR72.
134 See, e.g., WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 38.
135 See Research Proposal, supra note 126 (Bogue’s 1960 proposal reflects the tone and strategies of 
several earlier proposals).
136 See id. at 1.
137 Id. at 2.
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of force in order to assure that members of high fertility groups made the right 
choices.138
Nonetheless, it is a mistake to think that Bogue and his sponsors were 
uniformly uninterested in the lives of the poor or non-white people being studied.  
Indeed, Bogue worked throughout the 1960s on projects designed to study and 
prevent poverty.139  Nonetheless, Bogue stated that the people he studied were 
culturally or genetically dysfunctional and incompetent to make their own 
reproductive choices.140
Similar beliefs colored the research and legal reforms outlined by Bogue for 
the Council between 1960 and 1968.  Beginning with his pilot program in poor, 
African-American areas of Chicago, the Council sponsored research on how to get 
the contraceptively incompetent to make the choice to have fewer children.  A 
number of strategies were adopted to increase the probability that the right choices 
would be made.  Bogue’s assistants sent targeted mailings to people living in 
housing projects and advertised in what Bogue called “ethnic newspapers,” like the 
Chicago Defender.141  Frequently, he used volunteers who appeared to be objective 
or even friendly to dispense advice.  African-American volunteers were instructed 
to befriend people in the neighborhoods studied before advising them to stop 
having children.142  Those with medical training were supposed to characterize 
their recommendations as objective medical advice rather than as propaganda put 
out by the Council.143
By 1963, Bogue had better articulated his research objectives for the Council.  
First, his assistants developed a manual that could be used to get any person in any 
region to make the “right” reproductive choice.144  Second, Bogue’s group 
collected data on “Negro” fertility and on general correlations between race, class, 
and fertility, so that the Population Council would have more concrete findings to 
show potential supporters in the government.145
Between 1963 and 1966, the Executive Board of the Council began to agree 
with Bogue that a reduction in the size of high fertility groups could be achieved 
only through formal legal reform and government financial support and a 
138  See id.
139 See Minutes of a Meeting of the Rockefeller Council Executive Board (May 9, 1966) in The 
Rockefeller Archive, Rockefeller University, POPULATION COUNCIL PAPERS, Box 56, Folder 903.
140 See id.  See also, e.g., Birth Control Facts Urged for Negroes, CHI. TRIB, Apr. 27, 1962, at A2..
141 Research Proposal, Problems of Bearing and Rearing Children in High-Fertility, Low-Income 
American Families, *25 (1960) in The Rockefeller Archive, Rockefeller University, POPULATION 
COUNCIL PAPERS, Box 46, Folder 653.  See also Chicago Fertility Control Experiments, Preliminary 
Findings, *4 (May 23, 1963) in The Rockefeller Archive, Rockefeller University, POPULATION 
COUNCIL PAPERS, Box 56, Folder 903.
142 See Research Proposal, supra note 126, at 25.
143 See, e.g., Research Proposal, supra note 126, at 26-27.
144 See Research Proposal, *2 (Nov. 19, 1962) in The Rockefeller Archive, Rockefeller University, 
POPULATION COUNCIL PAPERS, Box 56, Folder 903.
145 See Research Proposal, supra note 126, at *1, *7-8.
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redefinition of reproductive choice.146  By 1966, Bogue had become deeply critical 
of the existing strategies of researchers financed by the Ford Foundation and the 
Milbank Fund.147  Instead, Bogue argued, a more “large-scale effort” was needed, 
which would require “a great deal of technical assistance from sponsoring 
agencies” in government.148
By 1966, many members of the Executive Board of the Council had been 
persuaded by Bogue’s arguments.  A number of proposals were considered in that 
year to maximize governmental funding and involvement at both the state and 
federal level, including grants to welfare and health departments to start 
contraception programs among high fertility groups, to create federal agencies to 
fund research on contraceptive incompetence, and to disseminate pamphlets to the 
poor on the benefits of contraception.149
Through working with Bogue and similar researchers, the Council developed 
an effective new legal strategy to achieve improvements in the quality of the 
population.150  By the late 1960s, none of the Council’s proposals was labeled 
eugenic or invoked the use of governmental coercion that had been the hallmark of 
earlier eugenic law reforms.151  Indeed, the Council’s new strategy required the 
organization’s activists to avoid all overt political lobbying before research on a 
particular subject had been carried out.152
It would be a mistake, however, to think that the leaders of the Council were 
no longer interested in legal reform.  Instead, by collecting seemingly legitimate 
academic research results and using private funding, the leaders of the Council 
hoped to show governmental agencies and leaders the benefits of enacting the 
measures supported by the Council.
Many of the benefits emphasized by members of the Council were thought to 
be related to population control, including an improvement in the quality of the 
population if the overall rate of growth were reduced.153  However, because of the 
organization’s new emphasis on reproductive choice, the leaders of the Council 
wanted to avoid any overt reference to quality population or eugenic reform.  
Research sponsored by the Council bolstered the theory that the quality of the 
population would necessarily be improved if population growth were checked.  
This was the case, researchers argued, because the most socially inadequate people 
often had the most children.  In the eyes of some leaders of the Council, a 
population control reform would necessarily have eugenic benefits, and the Council 
146 See Minutes, supra note 139, at 1-3.
147 See id. at 1.
148  See id. at 2.
149 See id. at 1.
150 See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 495.
151 See Minutes, supra note 139, at 1-3.
152 See id.
153 See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 495.
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would profit from invoking reproductive choice rather than the need for quality 
population or eugenic reform.
After focusing on what the Council now called population control, the 
organization’s members consistently stressed that they respected an individual’s 
reproductive choices.  However, what it meant to respect reproductive choice was 
itself becoming a subject of debate.  Those volunteering in projects for the Council 
were to ensure that members of high fertility groups made the right choices.  To 
accomplish this task, volunteers were told to approach women who had recently 
delivered children, because those women were then were physically weak and 
emotionally vulnerable.154  Similarly, Council volunteers were told to assume roles 
that would make their advice more influential.155  Increasingly, these activities 
reflected a belief that particular individuals were intrinsically unable to make the 
right choice for themselves.
In several years’ worth of research sponsored by the Council, a definition of 
contraceptive incompetence emerged that was connected to both race and class.  
Thus, in the later 1960s, as the Council began openly to lobby for its preferred 
reforms, a new debate had emerged about the future of American reproductive law.  
Instead of questioning whether individual choice should be an important factor in 
the debate, the discussion now centered on what the meaning of choice should be.
B. Human Betterment and Selling Sterilization
In many ways, the transformation of the Council into an organization 
purportedly interested only in population control was easy: as early as the 1930s, 
Osborn and Notestein had written about the eugenic and humanitarian problems 
that would follow from unchecked population growth.156  The Human Betterment 
Association for Voluntary Sterilization was a different kind of organization.157  
Formed in the 1920s by California eugenicists Paul Popenoe and E. S. Gosney, 
Human Betterment was founded primarily to promote compulsory eugenic 
sterilization laws.158  The leaders of Human Betterment were particularly 
committed to the use of compulsory sterilization laws as a eugenic solution.159  
After World War II, members of the public were suspicious of the use of such 
154 Research Proposal, supra note 126, at 26-27.
155 See, e.g., id.
156 See text accompanying supra notes 119-120.
157 See, e.g., Fred Hogue, Social Eugenics, L. A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1936, at 31 (referring to 
organization as Human Betterment Foundation)(The Human Betterment Association for Voluntary
Sterilization, as it was later called, had a dizzying array of names in the years between 1940 and 1966); 
see also Fred Hogue, Social Eugenics, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 16, 1939, at II9 (referring to organization as 
Human Betterment Association).  For ease of understanding, this article will refer to the organization as 
Human Betterment.
158 See generally, Hogue, Social Eugenics (1939) supra note 157.
159 See, e.g., Human Sterilization, Human Betterment Foundation, Eugenics Archive, available at
http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/static/images/1753.html.
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sterilization laws.160  Human Betterment’s commitment to the use of coercion and 
to sterilization in particular put the organization’s continuing political viability in 
doubt.
The reception of proposals to expand compulsory sterilization laws made 
apparent the political obstacles Human Betterment’s leaders faced in the 1950s.161  
Human Betterment activists remained convinced that only sterilization would 
improve the quality of the population, because sterilization required less day-to-day 
attention on the part of the individual and was a more permanent contraceptive 
solution.162  A majority of the members of Human Betterment also believed that 
existing sterilization laws were too narrow: there were socially inadequate persons 
who they believed should be sterilized and who did not qualify as insane or 
feebleminded under the new, narrow interpretations of eugenic sterilization 
laws.163
The fate of Human Betterment between 1945 and 1955 might seem to 
suggest that World War II did mark the effective end of eugenic legal reform.  In 
that period, the organization cycled through a series of names and images, all the 
while struggling to find adequate funding.164  By 1955, the leadership of Human 
Betterment had concluded that eugenic legal reform was no longer a realistic 
solution.  Instead, members sought to fund so-called voluntary sterilizations for 
people who were not covered by existing sterilization laws but who were still 
considered inadequate.165
However, the evolution of Human Betterment tells a story about the 
relationship between eugenics and law after World War II that differs from the 
traditional account.  Without ever changing their goals or preferred methods, the 
leaders of Human Betterment effectively campaigned for the removal of state and 
federal bans on the use of family planning aid for voluntary sterilization.  Instead of 
changing the substance of their agenda, members of Human Betterment changed 
only their rhetoric.  The organization’s leaders concluded that eugenic sterilization 
could still be realistically supported so long as the organization advocated 
reproductive choice.
Human Betterment’s emphasis on choice grew out of a long correspondence 
between its leaders and Hugh Moore, the founder of the Dixie Cup Company.  A 
160 See text accompanying supra notes 28-30.
161 See id.
162 See, e.g., Clinic Defended on Sterilization, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1962, at A1.  Ruth Proskauer 
Smith, the chairman of the organization’s executive board, explained, “for the poor and uneducated, . . . 
surgical birth control is the only answer.”  Id.
163 See text accompanying supra notes 60-61.
164 See, e.g., Letter from John Cox, Treasurer of Human Betterment Association, to Hugh Moore 
(Jan. 3, 1955) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript 
Library, Princeton University; see also Letter from Hugh Moore to Ruth Proskauer Smith (Apr. 30, 
1959) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, 
Princeton University.
165 See Letter from Ruth Proskauer Smith to Hugh Moore (Apr. 4, 1956) in THE HUGH MOORE 
PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
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longtime donor to the organization, Moore believed that Human Betterment could 
not improve the quality of the population solely by funding private sterilization of 
the socially inadequate.166  In 1961, Moore wrote to Ruth Proskauer Smith, the 
executive director of Human Betterment, and suggested a related change of 
course.167  Moore recommended that less money be used for actual sterilizations, 
so that more could be spent to rehabilitate the image of sterilization.168  If this were 
done, Moore asserted, it would be easier to convince people to be sterilized and to 
persuade state and federal agencies to support voluntary sterilization.169  It was 
hoped that sterilization might be associated not with Nazism but with human rights 
and personal choice.
In 1961, the controversy surrounding a new Virginia voluntary sterilization 
law that Human Betterment had advocated made apparent the need to change the 
image of sterilization as well as its legal status.170  As a primary goal, the leaders of 
Human Betterment had long campaigned for the introduction of statutory 
protections for doctors performing voluntary sterilizations.171  Although only three 
states explicitly provided for penalties for physicians and patients involved in 
voluntary sterilizations, physicians in a majority of states still expressed concern 
about potential common law or statutory liability.172  In response, a number of 
hospitals restricted the availability of these surgeries.173  In order to increase the 
number of voluntary sterilizations, leaders of Human Betterment believed they 
would first have to clarify the legal status of the procedure.174
The response to the Fauquier County Project, as Human Betterment activists 
termed the Virginia statute, made clear that no more states would adopt similar 
laws unless the public was first convinced that the sterilizations were truly 
voluntary.  At first, the Fauquier County Project appeared to be a victory for 
Human Betterment.  In March 1961, the Virginia state legislature passed a law 
formally authorizing a voluntary sterilization program for “medically indigent” 
women.175  Several legislators who favored the bill professed their belief that the 
bill would function like a bill that had died in committee, which provided for the 
166 See id.
167 Letter from Hugh Moore to Ruth Proskauer Smith (Dec. 13, 1961) in THE HUGH MOORE 
PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 Charles Windle, Factors in the Passage of Sterilization Legislation: The Case of Virginia, 29
PUB. OP. Q. 306, 306-314 (1965) (providing a contemporary analysis of the reasoning of legislators who 
introduced Virginia’s voluntary sterilization law).
171 See Clinic Defended, supra note 162, at A1.
172 See Linda Champlin and Mark Winslow, Elective Sterilization, 113 U.PA.L.REV. 415, 425 
(1965)( A contemporary study indicated that doctors would most likely be found liable under either a 
common-law or statutory theory of assault and battery or mayhem).
173 Id. at 419.
174 See id.
175 See Windle, supra note 170, at 306-307.
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compulsory sterilization of unwed mothers: it would reduce the number of children 
born to women on relief.176
Those trained by Human Betterment were instructed to ensure that indigent 
patients made the right reproductive choice.  First, Human Betterment volunteers 
were advised to approach women immediately after they had delivered children, a 
time when the women were thought most likely to agree to sterilization.177  In 
explaining the procedure, volunteers were similarly advised to emphasize the 
advantages of the procedure and to explain its effects in abstract, simple 
language.178  In the short term, this strategy seemed to work.179
By 1962, however, the drawbacks of the procedure were apparent.  Hospital 
officials, like leaders of Human Betterment, were accused of being racist and of 
maintaining ties to the eugenic legal reform movement of the earlier twentieth 
century.180 Defending her organization in the face of attacks by Catholic and 
African-American leaders, Smith argued that the program benefited “the poor and 
uneducated... for whom surgical birth control is the only answer.”181  Privately, 
however, other leaders of Human Betterment recognized that state governments, 
health departments, welfare agencies, and hospitals would not expand the 
availability of sterilization unless the procedure was first made less 
controversial.182
In the spring of 1962, when Moore and Smith began working with a public 
relations agency to rehabilitate the idea of sterilization laws, both Moore and Smith 
were convinced that reproductive choice would have to be emphasized.183  Their 
goal was straightforward: the leaders Human Betterment could use sterilization as a 
eugenic tool only if they changed the political meaning of sterilization.  After 
working through several drafts with the agency, Smith crafted a statement of 
purpose emphasizing human rights, individual choice, and humanitarian concerns 
raised by the rate of world population growth.184  Even Moore was surprised by the 
shift in tone seen in the memorandum.  He wrote, “[t]he only question I have on 
first reading is that HBA is unalterably opposed to compulsory sterilization. I 
thought we favored the sterilization of imbeciles and the like in public 
institutions.”185
176 See id. at 313, 318.
177 See Gerald Grant, Birth Control Clinic “Amazed” at Sterilization, WASH. POST, Sep. 9, 1962, at 
B1.
178 See Virginians Calm on Sterilization, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 14, 1962, at 20.
179 See Clinic Defended, supra note 162, at A1.
180 See id.; see also Nate Haseltine, Only the Wealthy or Ill Are Sterilized Here, WASH. POST, Sep. 
12, 1962, at A1.
181 See Clinic Defended, supra note 162, at A1.
182 See, e.g., Hugh Moore to Ruth Proskauer Smith, supra note 167.
183 Letter from Hugh Moore to Ruth Proskauer Smith (Mar. 14, 1962) in THE HUGH MOORE 
PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
184 See Letter from Hugh Moore to Ruth Proskauer Smith (Oct. 19, 1962) in THE HUGH MOORE 
PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
185 See id.
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Moore soon came to believe that the organization could more effectively 
improve the quality of the population if members praised voluntary procedures and 
individual choice.186  In accepting the position of President of Human Betterment, 
Moore explained, “I had become convinced... that sterilization is one of the most 
likely means of saving civilization and that the public should be made aware of it—
and understand what it is. As a businessman, I have spent my life selling ideas, and 
by that means, products.”187  What was needed, Moore explained, was a better 
effort in “selling sterilization.”188
Between 1961 and 1966, the organization worked to “sell sterilization” by 
emphasizing that it was voluntarily chosen.  Whenever the organization received a 
substantial grant, Human Betterment created a “plan” whereby indigent people in a 
particular geographic area would be encouraged to “choose” sterilization.189  The 
rest of the organization’s funding went to publicity and “education” programs, 
including conferences on voluntary sterilization as a human right or as a matter of 
population control.190
Since 1963, Moore had believed that concern about world population control 
would help Human Betterment to promote sterilization as much as would an 
emphasis on reproductive choice.191  Invoking the threat of world population 
growth, Human Betterment pamphlets produced in the mid-1960s argued that 
sterilization helped the poor by improving their economic position.192  Sterilization 
would not only reduce the number of undesirable persons, but would also help the 
poor by reducing overall population growth.193  In practice, Human Betterment 
conducted no research and provided no funding for population control measures.  
Although Human Betterment pamphlets consistently mentioned an International 
Advisory Committee on Population Control, that committee did not meet once or 
186 Hugh Moore, Chairman, Human Betterment Ass’n for Voluntary Sterilization, Speech Made in 
Acceptance of Position as Chairman (November 20, 1964) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 
15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See, e.g., Letter from Ruth Proskauer Smith to Jesse Hartman (July 15, 1964) in THE HUGH 
MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University 
(establishing a new Hartman Fund to provide sterilizations for the indigent in Palm Beach and Broward 
County and confirming donation for a similar fund for work in Kentucky); Letter from John Rague, 
Treasurer of Human Betterment, to Hugh Moore (June 5, 1965) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, 
Box 15, Folder 7,  Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (announcing the 
establishment of a fund named after donor).
190 See Hugh Moore, Fundraising Statement (December 1965) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 
313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
191 See, e.g., Letter from Hugh Moore to Admiral Lewis Strauss (Oct. 23, 1963) in THE HUGH 
MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University (“The present 
rapidly growing interest in the population explosion is gaining many converts for the idea of 
sterilization.”).
192 See, e.g., id.
193 See id.
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receive any funding before 1967.194  Human Betterment’s leaders remained 
committed to using sterilization to improve the quality of the population.195  The 
idea of population control, like the idea of reproductive choice, was simply an 
effective tool in doing so.
By 1967, the organization highlighted issues of reproductive choice in its 
ultimately successful campaign to remove a ban on the use of federal OEO family 
planning funds for voluntary sterilizations.196  A variety of public health and 
welfare officials joined leaders of the organization in calling for the lifting of the 
OEO ban.197
The strategy of emphasizing reproductive choice had been effective: by 1971, 
the OEO removed the ban on the use of federal funds for voluntary 
sterilizations.198  Although Human Betterment had changed its message in order to 
accomplish this task, the organization had not fundamentally changed its goals.  
Consider the organization’s fundraising letter of 1966: “[o[ver-croweded cities, 
polluted air and water, countless unwanted and suffering children, skyrocketing 
taxes for welfare!  Half of the babies now born from some cities are from indigent 
families on relief.  Need we say more?”199
Well into the 1960s, Human Betterment remained committed to using reform 
to reduce the number of “babies [...] born [... to] indigent families on relief.”200  
Leaders of the organization were happy to invoke the idea of reproductive choice in 
order to achieve their goals, especially when members of the organization could 
define choice for themselves.
III. NORTH CAROLINA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF COMPULSORY STERILIZATION 
LEGISLATION
In 1933, North Carolina became one of the last states to adopt a eugenic 
sterilization statute.201  Before the decision of Buck v. Bell in 1927, there was 
considerable uncertainty about the constitutionality of existing sterilization laws,202
194 Letter from Hugh Moore to John Rague (Oct. 4, 1966) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, 
Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University (“The United States Association for 
Voluntary Sterilization has had a letterhead International Advisory Committee for some years, which 
has never met.”); see also Letter from Hugh Moore to John Rague, et al. (Apr. 24, 1967) in THE HUGH 
MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University (complaining 
that committee had still not met).
195 See, e.g., Letter from Hugh Moore to Admiral Lewis Strauss, supra note 191( Moore repeatedly 
wrote that population control politics would be an effective tool in promoting sterilization).
196 See, e.g., text accompanying infra notes 198-199.
197 See id.
198 See Louis Kohlmeier, In ’72, U.S. Financed 100,000 Sterilizations, CHI. TRIB., December 2, 
1973, at A12 (The OEO itself was estimated to have funded as many as 100,000 sterilizations in 1972.
199 Fundraising Letter (November 1966) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 7, 
Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
200 See Kohlmeier, supra note 198.
201 Woodside, supra note 1, at 20.  See also Eugenics Board of North Carolina Manual (1960).
202 See LANDMAN, supra note 22, at 49.
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but the decision in Buck provided a template for states, including North Carolina, 
that wanted to enact sterilization laws of their own.203
Over the next fifteen years, however, North Carolina emerged as one of the 
states that most vigorously applied its sterilization policy.  A 1957 study of eugenic 
sterilization law that was published in the Georgetown Law Review found that only 
four states consistently sterilized more than one hundred people a year: California, 
Georgia, Virginia, and North Carolina.204  According to reports published by North 
Carolina’s own Eugenics Board, the number of sterilizations per year between 1947 
and 1957 was between four hundred and seven hundred.205  The biennial report 
from 1950-1952 noted a record high of 704 sterilizations, up from the prior record 
of 468 in the period between 1948-1950.206  If an identification with Nazism 
spelled an end for American sterilization laws, it did not do so immediately, at least 
not in North Carolina.
An association with Nazism did mean that North Carolina’s law had to 
change.  After World War II, North Carolina restricted the application of its 
compulsory law, limiting it strictly to the mentally ill and clearly handicapped.207  
For the first time, the state published a manual intending to ensure certain 
procedural protections.  No longer could sterilizations occur without the consent of 
a family member or, in the case of mental retardation, without the patient’s consent 
to an intelligence test.208
These changes reflected the influence of World War II.  Nazism was 
associated with coercion and broad laws applied to members of the general 
population.209  Physicians and eugenics boards found to have gone beyond 
sterilizing the clearly mentally ill or handicapped had sometimes been subject to 
devastating lawsuits.210  These lawsuits also showed that a sterilization law that 
appeared too broad or compulsory would draw considerable criticism.
However, World War II had not changed the motivations behind North 
Carolina’s compulsory sterilization law.  Indeed, North Carolina did not repeal its 
compulsory sterilization law until 1975.211  Strangely, however, it was pro-eugenic 
activists who opposed a broader use of compulsory sterilization.  Woodside and 
other supporters of eugenic policies in North Carolina argued instead that choice 
and consent were necessary to the survival of eugenics in law.212  If force were 
203 See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 20.
204 See O’Hara, supra note 2, at 35.
205 See BIENNIAL REP. OF THE EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA , 1968, SUMMARY 
STATISTICS (1968).
206 BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1950-1952 14 (1952).
207 EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL § 50 AT 2, 5 (1960).
208 Id. at § 80.
209 See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 23-24.
210 See, e.g. Heiress Sues Her Mother, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1936, at 12; see also Joanna Schoen, 
Between Choice and Coercion: Women and the Politics of Sterilization in North Carolina, 1929-1975, 
13 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 132, 132 (2001).
211 See Schoen, supra note 210, at 132.
212 See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 71.
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used against unwed mothers, Woodside predicted that “a great deal of hostility 
might be stirred up which could jeopardize the whole existence of the law.”213 In 
contrast, a law that appeared voluntary would rarely be scrutinized and could be 
used more broadly.  Woodside argued that “persuasion and argument are 
legitimately used [to elicit consent for a sterilization], but compulsion never.”214  
This was because only a voluntary law could win popular support in the long term.  
She predicted that a voluntary law could even “eliminate the organized opposition 
of religious bodies.”215  If officials could convince the public that North Carolina’s 
sterilization law was voluntary, Woodside suggested, they would have a freer hand 
in coercing unwed mothers into being sterilized.216
It seems paradoxical for a compulsory sterilization statute to be administered 
as a voluntary law.  Woodside suggested two interpretations of how such a statute 
could function.217  Under one interpretation, the law would be compulsory only as 
a formal legal matter, but would in fact be used by doctors willing to help women 
otherwise unable to obtain birth control.218  Under the other interpretation, the
doctors and social workers administering the law would claim that they were 
sterilizing only those who wanted to be sterilized, because by making such a claim, 
the people who administered sterilization statutes could avoid the public scrutiny 
and procedural safeguards associated with compulsory sterilization laws.  Between 
1950 and 1968, the North Carolina statute was applied to women who were less 
severely mentally ill, and the argument was made that the women who were 
sterilized consented to the operations.  The critical question is whether these 
sterilizations were voluntary in fact or only in appearance.  Answering this question 
involves considering the ways in which doctors secured the consent of individuals 
who did not understand or request sterilization.
At the outset, it is important to note that many sterilization decisions were 
made by doctors and social workers ignoring the formal procedures required by the 
Eugenics Board.  Between 1945 and 1950, there had already been 200 sterilizations 
in a single North Carolina hospital, not all of which were authorized by the 
Eugenics Board.219  In one county, 23 of 59 sterilizations performed in one year 
were unauthorized.220  Second, by 1950, these doctors had begun to claim that the 
sterilizations they administered were chosen voluntarily by the nominally 
feebleminded women they approached.221  The transfer of authority to doctors and 
social workers changed the administration of North Carolina’s law, especially 
because doctors could choose to perform sterilizations without outside attention 
213 See id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 24.
216 See id.
217 Id. at 58, 103.
218 See Schoen, supra note 210, at 134.
219 WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 49.
220 Id.
221 Id.
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and could thus afford to pay less attention to the formal rules set forth by the 
Eugenics Board.  As doctors and social workers took greater responsibility for the 
administration of sterilization statutes, the enforcement of North Carolina’s law 
became more informal and was more likely in violation of procedural protections 
specified in state regulations.
Two trends confirm that this was the case.  First, a much larger proportion of 
sterilizations took place outside state institutions and involved women too healthy 
to be confined in those institutions.222  Because these sterilizations were argued to 
be voluntary, administrators in the state could sterilize people not sick enough to be 
institutionalized—those often characterized as feebleminded—at a greater rate.223  
In 1954-56, for example, 219 of the women sterilized were already confined in 
state institutions, and only 175 of the women sterilized were outside of state 
institutions.224  By 1962-64, as many as 378 women were sterilized outside state 
institutions, with only 112 women in state institutions being sterilized.225  This 
trend signaled two things.  First, it confirmed that sterilization candidates did not 
need to be clearly mentally ill.  Second, the trend suggests that sterilizations were 
more often administered informally and outside the institutions in which operations 
were meant to take place.
A second trend makes clear that mental illness was no longer the primary 
reason a woman was singled out for sterilization.  Of the people sterilized between 
1950 and 1968, a growing proportion were women deemed to be feebleminded.  In 
1954-56, 111 sterilized women had been diagnosed as mentally diseased and 392 as 
feebleminded.226  By 1966-68, when as many as 250 sterilized women were still 
characterized as feebleminded, only sixteen were diagnosed with a mental 
illness.227  Even in the 1920s, many eugenicists acknowledged that 
feeblemindedness was not a biological concept but rather a catchall term applied to 
behaviors seen to be antisocial or immoral.228  By the 1950s, the scientific validity 
of “feeblemindedness” would have been even more in doubt.229 The feebleminded 
women sterilized in North Carolina between 1950 and 1968 were less and less 
likely to be mentally ill or handicapped.
Instead, they were increasingly likely to be single women who were sexually 
active or who were feared to become so in the future.230  In 1954-1956, there were 
222 See id. at 15.
223 See id.
224 BIENNIAL REP. OF THE EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1954-1956, 13-15 (1956).
225 BIENNIAL REP. OF THE EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1962-1964, 13-15 (1964).
226 See BIENNIAL REP., 1968, supra note 205, at 12-15.
227 See id.
228 See, e.g., POPENOE, supra note 52, at 323.
229 See Henry Nelson, Genetic Experts Split on Controlled Breeding, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 11, 1966, at 
A2 (Advances in genetics might not have cast the same doubt on eugenic thinking that it cast on the 
terminology of eugenic science).
230 BIENNIAL REP., 1968, supra note 205, at 12-15.
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139 married sterilization patients in North Carolina and 364 unmarried patients.231  
By 1966-68, there were only 27 female married patients, and the number of 
unmarried female patients remained as high as 244.232  Doctors could sterilize a 
disproportionate number of unmarried women who were not obviously 
handicapped or ill by claiming that the women themselves wanted to be sterilized.
It is worth asking whether these sterilizations were truly voluntary.  There are 
three reasons to be skeptical.  First, many advocates of sterilization as a birth 
control method argued that it was married women with large families and little 
money who frequently demanded birth control.233  Similarly, the voluntary 
sterilization program operating in Virginia publicized the fact that it primarily 
served married women.234  Yet in the period between 1950 and 1968, a smaller and 
smaller proportion of women sterilized in North Carolina were married.235
A second reason to be suspicious of claims that North Carolina’s sterilization 
patients chose sterilization is the hostility directed towards unwed mothers.  In fact, 
North Carolina tried several times to pass a criminal law prescribing sterilization as 
a punishment for all women who had had more than a certain number of children 
out of wedlock.236  Legislators supporting bills designed to punish unwed mothers 
argued that the bills showed “compassion for the persons who [were] unable to 
control their sexual desires.”237
In addition, one must consider the racial prejudice openly expressed by some 
of the legislators and doctors who discussed so-called voluntary sterilization policy 
in the state.  Before 1965, most hospitals were segregated and many black hospitals 
had neither the equipment nor the staff to perform a large number of operations.238  
After Brown v. Board of Education and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
hospitals were gradually desegregated and there was an increase in the proportion 
of sterilizations administered to black women.239  These sterilizations reflected 
eugenic as well as racial concerns.  Throughout the 1950s, politicians, sociologists, 
and psychiatrists argued that black women did not have the same morals as did 
other women.240
But why, if North Carolina’s Eugenics Board provided more procedural 
protections in 1950 than it had before, were doctors more able to circumvent those 
231 See id.
232 See id.
233 See Clinic Offers Aid by Sterilization, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 9, 1962, at 60; see also Haseltine, supra
note 180, at A1.
234 See Clinic Offers Aid, supra note 232, at 60.
235 See BIENNIAL REP., 1968, supra note 205, at 12-15.
236 See Harry Golden, Dealing with Illegitimacy, Letters to the Times, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1961, 
at 22.
237 Hearing Argues Sterilization, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1959, at A2l
238 See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 32-33.
239 See Kohlmeier, supra note 197 (Most notoriously, the only women subjected to government-
funded involuntary sterilizations in the 1970s were African-American).
240 See SOLLINGER, supra note 33, at 95-105.
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protections between 1950 and 1968?  For the most part, it was because doctors 
claimed that these sterilizations were voluntarily chosen.
Woodside’s study reveals some of the techniques used to elicit “consent” 
from women who did not or would not want to be sterilized.  Many social workers 
believed that “immoral” women could not reliably make the “right” choice.  
Woodside agreed that “no great success would be expected from the introduction of 
birth control to the unintelligent and the socially irresponsible.”241
Under the North Carolina law, Woodside explained, women did not need to 
be fully informed about what sterilization meant.  At the State Hospital at Raleigh, 
patients qualified as feebleminded were not informed about the effect of 
sterilization, even though the “feebleminded” included women who had “a history 
or likelihood of sexual misdemeanor in the community” who were thought 
otherwise to be capable of intelligent choice about sterilization.242  Second, North 
Carolina officials accepted the “consent” of a family member even if a sterilization 
candidate herself objected.243  At Goldsboro, as at Raleigh, “patients were not 
considered to be intelligent [enough] to consent, and the permission of relatives 
was considered to be sufficient.”244 But if a family objected and the candidate 
consented, the candidate was almost certainly considered competent to consent, 
even if she had been diagnosed as feebleminded.245
Another technique involved tricks used to secure the consent of the candidate 
herself.  At Morgantown Hospital, social workers proposed sterilization as close as 
possible to admission to the hospital, when relatives would be most distressed and 
likely to consent.246  At Samarcand, an institution for white juvenile delinquents, 
social workers pressured minors to consent, since family members of Samarcand 
girls often objected to sterilization.247  Other social workers pressured men to be 
sterilized. The men proposed instead that their wives be sterilized. 248
These techniques reflected a new idea of choice.  Although “voluntary” 
choice proved central to the survival of North Carolina’s eugenic law, “voluntary” 
choices included those choices made for unwed mothers by other people or by 
women who had not been informed about what they had chosen.  One North 
Carolina social worker summarized this view about “immoral” women and 
sterilization: “[y]ou can’t expect them... to be any more sensible about this than 
about other things....”249  Those applying North Carolina’s sterilization law often 
acted on similar views.  As the image of compulsory sterilization law in North 
241 WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 105.
242 Id. at 27, 29.
243 Id. at 37, 71.
244 Id. at 33, 29.
245 Id.
246 WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 30-31.
247 Id. at 37-38.
248 BIENNIAL REP. OF THE EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1948-1950 11 (1950).
249 WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 106.
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Carolina changed, pro-eugenic volunteers in the state also worked to redefine 
reproductive choice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Eugenic legal reformers had achieved great success by the 1930s.  Eugenic 
laws used various means to weed out the physically, mentally, or morally defective.  
World War II heavily influenced the fate of eugenic law but did not eliminate 
eugenics from law altogether.  An association with Nazism meant the decline and 
ultimate disappearance of compulsory sterilization laws, but not of all of the 
eugenic motivations behind those laws.
If anything, a number of factors made the moral element of eugenics seem 
more pressing.  Calls for integration, the influence of the Cold War, a long-term 
increase in national prosperity, a short-term spike in the number of illegitimate 
births, and the number of white unwed mothers might have made moral concerns 
more central than they had been in prior decades.  Many legislators still held beliefs 
that immoral parents inevitably had immoral children.  In order to prevent 
immorality, one had to decrease the number of children born to immoral parents.  
This result could be accomplished by reducing the number of children born to unfit 
parents or by making immoral parents reform.
If the moral element of eugenics still influenced law, World War II required 
eugenic laws to take a different form.  Nazism was too much associated with 
compulsory sterilization.  Legislators considering compulsory sterilization for 
unwed mothers instead had to adopt a range of legal alternatives that better 
reflected the importance of reproductive choice.
Pro-eugenic organizations similarly had to adapt to the new political climate 
by distancing themselves from the openly political groups that dominated the 
eugenic legal reform movement of the earlier twentieth century.  As importantly, 
the organizations had to reshape the very idea of eugenic reform.  To a large extent, 
activists working for those organizations did so by invoking and redefining the idea 
of reproductive choice.
It is a mistake to believe that eugenics disappeared as an important legal 
influence.  Eugenic rhetoric might have declined, but eugenic motivations and 
eugenic laws did not.  What made these laws successful was the ability of 
lawmakers and organizations to repackage eugenic laws as something more 
palatable.  The persistence of eugenics in American law shows how an ideology 
may be most effective when it is the most subtle.  Eugenics proved to be a subtle 
legal ideology indeed, capable of disguising itself in many ways, even in the 
language of free choice.
